Pak Sahafat – In a memo, “Abbas Mohammad Al-Zein” has discussed in detail the various dimensions of the deterrence power of Lebanon’s Hezbollah against the threats of the Zionist regime on the one hand and the growing weakness of this regime in dealing with the resistance front and especially Hezbollah on the other hand.
According to Pak Sahafat News Agency, Al-Mayadeen note writer Abbas Mohammad Al-Zein in an article entitled “What period of resistance do they put up” has raised the basic question of what factors prevented Israel from attacking Lebanon’s Hezbollah, especially in a period that was largely occupied with the Syrian war; This is an important issue that deserves to be examined in its various dimensions.
Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, in his speech at the funeral ceremony of the martyr Emad Mughniyeh in 2008, confidently said that there is no weakness in the resistance and that the path and plan and jihad of Martyr Mughniyeh and his brothers will continue with strength.
When the Israeli occupying forces were forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa region in May 2000, the resistance forces did not discuss the possible end of the role of the resistance, but rather, this force fundamentally controlled its power in order to protect this victory and consolidate its power.
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Zionist media: exercise of Hezbollah, forces Israel to reconsider its calculations
The July 2006 invasion of the Zionist regime’s army into Lebanon, a few years after the liberation of this country, was actually to test the strength of the resistance. The questions at that time revolved around whether the resistance could prevent Israel’s war against Lebanon. The answer to this question should be sought in the victory of Hezbollah in 2006 and the developments after that.
From that time until today, the power of resistance has been increasing in a prudent and calculated way. It is not only the statements of the leaders of the resistance or its media that tell us this, but the inability of the enemy to fight against the resistance shows us its correctness.
On August 2, 2010, the International Crisis Group, in a report entitled “Drums of War: Israel and the Axis of Resistance”, tried to explain why “since 2006, peace has prevailed in Israel and Lebanon. In this report, it was confirmed that the main reason for this is the concern of both sides that any new dream may be more extensive and destructive than the previous ones. This was while the political roots of the crisis remain unresolved and there are still bombs ready to explode between the two sides.
Since then, the Israeli regime wants to destroy Hezbollah; Hezbollah’s goal is nothing less than the destruction of the Zionist regime. The resistance chose a process that, while maintaining its security and military priorities, also pursues its political goals as in the past, with the condition that the firing button is in its own hand and instead of suffering unwanted failures, it achieves calculated successes. Based on this, we should ask, in what era of resistance are we living now?
Creating deterrence of resistance at the enemy’s threat level
The resistance in Lebanon tested the balance of power with the Zionist occupiers during the July 2006 war (33-day war). Since then, the priority of the resistance was not war with Israel, but providing the conditions and opportunity to advance the project of confronting Israel and creating a reliable deterrent power.
Until 2011, the concept of Hezbollah’s deterrence was realized in the fact that the Israeli regime failed to achieve the goals of 2006 and could not attack Lebanon again, but with the change of American policies in the region and the start of Washington’s plan in the Arab world and the start of the war in Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah started thinking about how to prevent Israel’s attacks on itself and Lebanon at the same time as the war in Syria.
Hezbollah’s goal was to stop any attempt by the Zionist regime to exploit the implementation of the American plan in Syria to achieve its Zionist goals, but the question has been raised for a long time, what stopped Israel from attacking Hezbollah? Was Israel afraid that it would not achieve its goal of starting this war, or was it basically in a situation where it could not use the opportunity of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria to destroy it.
Hezbollah sought to create an image of strategic equality with “Israel” and create the equation that its offensive capabilities are in no way inferior to Israel’s military capabilities. According to this Israeli institution, the reason why Hezbollah responded to Israel’s verbal threats at the same level was because it had entered the Syrian war and was trying to adjust its deterrence power to the existing challenges and dangers.
When Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah threatened Israel in February 2016 that in the event of an attack on the southern Dahiya, it would have to wait for Hezbollah to attack the ammonia tank in the occupied city of Haifa. The Israelis also saw that Hezbollah’s presence in a full-scale war in Syria and its anti-Israeli actions were taking place at the same time, and that one did not have a negative effect on the other.
To understand the extent of Hezbollah’s success in creating a deterrent against Israel, it is enough to look at the chaos that prevailed in the region and especially in Syria during a fiery decade, but Hezbollah’s entertainment in the Syrian crisis not only did not make Israel dare to attack it, but also led to the issue of determining the borders and the gas contract between Lebanon and Israel.
At the end of this detailed article, the writer of Al-Mayadin divided the life of the resistance in Lebanon into several periods or stages and wrote that the resistance of Lebanon’s Hezbollah against the occupation regime of Israel has had a period of building deterrence and confrontation power, during which Hezbollah sought to use its power to force Israel to refrain from any attack or war and at the same time be fully prepared to deal with any possible attack or war.
In this period, Hezbollah, knowing that the Israelis are worried about a multi-domain war, is trying to expand its military power and presence in different domains in order to protect itself by creating a deterrent capability and by expanding the domain. Conflicts increase the amount of damage to the Zionist regime in any possible confrontation.
While Hezbollah’s readiness to create deterrence power as well as power tools in various fields and the possibility of using it if necessary, remains at high levels, questions are also raised regarding the next era. Will Hezbollah be content with maintaining and strengthening its own strategy in the field of deterrence and power building, or is it preparing itself to enter a new era, i.e. direct and imminent battle? Will the occupying regime of Israel be able to maintain its current policy with what it sees from the increasing power and capabilities of Hezbollah, or will it decide on a war that it describes as “preventive”?